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Introduction 
 
There had been little research on parliamentary oversight in the Caribbean. Hamid Ghany (1994, 
1999, 2012) has written extensively on parliaments in the region, but his work has examined 
parliaments from an evolutionary and institutional perspective, rather than from a functional one. 
A few other scholars have focused on specific issues, such as human rights (Helfer, 2002), gender 
(Vassell, 2006), and constitutional matters (Barrow-Giles, 2010), but to date, little research has 
been undertaken on oversight. This is surprising, since perceived corruption levels are high in most 
Caribbean countries and because oversight has been found to be a major determinant of corruption 
Indeed, Stapenhurst, Pelizzo and Jacobs (2014) determined that variances in oversight capacity, 
including the political willingness of Members of Parliament (MPs) to ensure effective oversight, 
account for nearly half of the variation in perceived corruption across countries globally. 
 
This article seeks to address this gap. Two Commonwealth Caribbean countries were chosen for 
analysis: Trinidad & Tobago, as one of the ‘larger’ countries in the region, with a population in 
excess of two million, and Grenada, as one of the ‘smaller’ countries, with a population of around 
100,000. It is organized in the following way. In the first section, we briefly present the purpose 
of the article and our data sources. Then, we examine some of the contextual conditions that 
scholars have noted impact oversight. Thirdly, we consider the key oversight tools used, and focus 
in particular on Public Accounts Committees (PACs) which have a key role in scrutinizing public 
finance. We then examine some unique oversight approaches adopted in Trinidad & Tobago and 
Grenada, which may be replicable elsewhere in the region. In the final section, we draw some 
conclusions, regarding both the generalization of our results and the implications for other 
Caribbean countries. 
 
Background: Corruption 
 
That corruption hinders development has been well documented (e.g. Mauro, 1997, Wei and 
Kaufmann, 1999, Kaufmann, 2000). In 2016, the Bahamas and Barbados were reported as having 
the lowest levels of perceived corruption (scoring 66 and 61 points, respectively, out of a possible 
100) but even so they ranked 24th and 31st in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) of 176 countries (Transparency International, 2017). The highest levels of corruption 
were in Jamaica (39/100, ranking as the 83rd most corrupt country), Trinidad and Tobago (35/100, 
ranking 101st), and Guyana (34/100, ranking 106th). Corruption has, according to the scores on the 
CPI index, deteriorated over the past five years for all countries in the region (Transparency 
International, 2016); see Chart 1.The exception is Grenada, which scored 56/100 and ranked 46th 
most corrupt country in the world in 2016, compared with 68/100 and 79th   in 2007 (data for 
theChart 1: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (100=extremely low; 
0=extremely high corruption)  
 
Bahama and Barbados, 2014 and Grenada 2012-2015: no data 
Source: Transparency International (2017) 
 
 
 
Chart 2: Real GDP Growth 2012-17 (annual %) 
 
Source: World Data Atlas  
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intervening years is not available). Corruption is an important issue, especially given that it has 
hindered economic growth and development; over the past five years, growth has been 
disappointing across the region, with the notable exceptions of Grenada and, to a lesser extent, 
Guyana (see Chart 2). Correlations of Caribbean countries’ real GDP per capita growth and CPI 
scores over the past decade indicate a medium negative correlation (-0.3439). This supports 
Mauro’s (1997) contention that a 20 point improvement in TI’s CPI results in a 0.5 percentage 
point increase in GDP per capita growth.  
 
Trinidad & Tobago 
According to the US Department of Commerce (2016), bribes are not regularly required to 
facilitate routine business operations, but reports of corruption are common there. Indeed, Victor 
Hart, chairman of the Trinidad & Tobago Transparency Initiative, described the country as “a 
society of corruption” (Bruzual, 2010).  Public perceptions of corruption have increased amidst 
“…such [scandals] as the Urban Development Corporation of Trinidad & Tobago (UDECOTT) 
scandal…[where] the Executive Chairman was surrounded with corruption charges stemming 
from the biased granting of millions of dollars of contracts and from personally benefitting from 
such contracts” (Kirton and Niki, 2010) and reports on breaches on tendering procedures by the 
Trinidad and Tobago Electricity Commission in relation to jobs under the company’s Street 
Lighting and Implementation Unit.  
 
Various laws address corruption of public officials, including the Integrity in Public Life Act, the 
Prevention of Corruption Act, and the Police Complaints Authority Act. But implementation of 
legislation is a problem: allegations of corruption seldom work through the legal system, resulting 
“…in a scarcity of cases with legal outcomes”, with “…procurement processes [that are] not fully 
transparent [and that] government ministries bypassed or manipulated established procurement 
procedures to favor specific vendors” (US Department of Commerce, 2016, p.1-2). There has been 
serious concern over public procurement for many years; it was a factor in the downfall of the 
2001 and 2010 governments. A Procurement Bill was passed in 2015 which established the Office 
of Procurement Regulation to act as the governing body for matters relating to public procurement 
and the retention and disposal of public property. 
 
Grenada 
The Prevention of Corruption Act and the Integrity in Public Life Act, the legislative core of 
Grenada’s anticorruption efforts, were both passed in 2007 while a decree passed in 2013 under 
the Integrity in Public Life Act that mandated all public officials declare their personal assets by 
April 3, 2014. 
Transparency International (2016) reported progress and high levels of corruption; this finding 
drew mixed responses. Jude Bernard (2017) stated that “…there is widespread institutionalized 
corruption in our society. It is at the point where people have gotten so accustomed to it being that 
way, that they just more or less accept it. Sometimes we simply refer to it as ‘just politics’.” By 
contrast, the Integrity Commission and the Finance Intelligence Unit said “For our part, such a 
listing is surprising, given that Grenada has made significant and consistent strides in strengthening 
its anti-corruption mechanism over the past five years” (Straker, 2017). 
 
Purpose and Data 
 
This article aims to present our research findings on parliamentary oversight in the Trinidad & 
Tobago and Grenada, thereby at least partially addressing the gap in knowledge of oversight in the 
Caribbean. If the causal path that higher levels corruption adversely affects economic 
development, and that enhanced parliamentary oversight can mitigate corruption (Stapenhurst, 
Pelizzo and Jacobs, 2014) holds true for the Caribbean, these findings should prove useful to 
parliamentarians, development practitioners and general citizens seeking to boost development in 
the region. 
  
Data were collected from two sources: First, we collected field data in January 2017. This 
comprised an in-country document search and 39 key informant interviews (9 MPs/Senators; 8 
journalists; 11 parliamentary staff and 8 civil society representatives) using a survey instrument 
initially developed by Stapenhurst (2011) and revised for the British Academy/United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development’s Anti-Corruption Evidence research program. Second, 
we utilized data from a survey of more than 100 legislatures globally conducted in 2015-6 by the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union; this enabled us to triangulate our results and make some global 
inferences.      
 
 
Setting the Stage: Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada – Contextual Factors 
 
Wang (2005), echoing Olson and Mezey (1991) and Olson and Norton (1996), claimed that 
contextual factors determined the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight tools and mechanisms. 
Building on her framework, Stapenhurst (2011) identified 10 contextual factors impacting 
oversight. These are used as a framework for analysis in this section.  
 
Size, Population and Economy 
It has been suggested by Fisman and Gatti (2000), Treisman (2000) and Knack and Azfar (2000) 
that larger countries are more corrupt than smaller ones.1 While both Grenada and Trinidad & 
Tobago are, by global standards, small, the latter is, by Caribbean standards, a fairly large state 
(1,981 square miles) with a population of 1.3 million. Furthermore, Trinidad & Tobago as a 
significant oil industry, a relatively large economy and a GDP per capita of around US 32,000. 
Grenada, by contrast, is geographically much smaller (134 square miles), less populated (110,000) 
                                                
1 While the eight countries reported by Transparency International to have the lowest levels of corruption globally – 
namely Denmark, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Singapore and the Netherlands – are all 
‘small’, the dispersion of ‘very small’ countries is greater, with Luxembourg ranking 11th, Iceland 14th, Bahamas 
24th and Bhutan 27th.  
and poorer (GDP per capita of US 13,600). Trinidad & Tobago is ethnically diverse (35% Indian, 
34% African), while Grenada is more homogenous (89% African). 
 
There is a strong, positive and significant relationship between economic wealth, which is one of 
the indicators of development, and corruption. In other words, countries that are richer are less 
corrupt (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004). The data presented in Table 1 shows that while both 
countries are middle-income countries, the GDP per capita is two and a half times higher in 
Trinidad & Tobago than in Grenada and, therefore, should be associated with, and possibly 
conducive, to less corruption. 
 
Several studies, including those undertaken by the World Bank (Mody, 2004), indicate that small 
countries tend to be less corrupt than large countries. Large countries may present administrative 
challenges, create conditions for inefficiency, effectiveness and misallocation of resources.  Both 
Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada are small, but it is perhaps reasonable to hypothesize that Grenada 
is less corrupt because of its very small size.   
 
Colonial Heritage 
Treisman (2000) noted that a country’s colonial heritage impacts corruption; more specifically, he 
noted that former British colonies have lower levels of corruption than former colonies of other 
European countries. Both Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada were claimed by Spain, but there is no 
record of the Spanish landing in Grenada. French colonization of Grenada began in 1650 but in 
1763 Grenada was ceded to the British whose rule continued, except for brief French rule (1779-
84), until 1974. By contrast, the Spanish settled in Trinidad and Tobago as early as the mid-
16th.century and ruled the country through 1797 when it was seized by the British. From 1958 to 
1962 both countries were part of the Federation of the West Indies2. Trinidad & Tobago became 
independent in 1962.  
 
Elections, Government 
Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2001) proposed that countries with majoritarian (‘first past the post’ 
or FPTP) electoral systems tend to have lower levels of corruption than countries with proportional 
representation (PR) systems, because the former creates a direct link between voters and 
politicians. Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) concurred. Both Trinidad & Tobago and 
Grenada have two chambers: a lower House of Representatives elected on a FPTP electoral system 
(FPTP) and Senate whose members are appointed by the head of state. In Trinidad & Tobago, 16 
Senators are appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, six Senators on the advice of the Leader 
of the Opposition and nine Senators to represent other sectors of civil society (the only function 
the President of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago takes without consultation) while in Grenada 
                                                
2 A short-lived federation comprising Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, the Cayman Islands, Dominica, 
Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad & 
Tobago and the Turks and Caicos Islands 
seven Senators are appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, three by the Opposition Leader 
and three to represent other sectors of society. 
 
Since both Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada have majoritarian electoral systems, and appointed 
Senators, this factor cannot be used to explain differences in corruption. 
 
Generally, it is thought that political competitiveness and effective opposition parties help 
constrain corruption (e.g. Schleiter and Voznata, 2012). 3  There is currently no opposition 
representation in the House of Representatives of Grenada, since all 15 seats were won by the New 
National Party4. As a result, it is perhaps reasonable to expect Trinidad & Tobago to be less corrupt, 
because of the prominence of an opposition party in its parliament.  
 
In both Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada, parliamentarians who serve as Ministers are full-time; 
all other Members are part-time. This results in a significant difference in salaries between 
Ministers, on the one hand, and back-bench and Opposition MPs, on the other. One implication 
for oversight may be that MPs (and Senators) who hold part-time positions and pursue careers 
outside of parliament may not have sufficient time to undertake their oversight responsibilities 
(Stapenhurst, 2016).  
 
Political Parties 
Both countries have a two-party system5, although in Trinidad & Tobago a third emerged recently 
(but has no seats in parliament). 
 
It is not entirely clear to what extent party strength may affect a parliament’s ability to effectively 
perform oversight and thus impact the level of corruption (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2014). Party 
strength may be measured in votes, seats, income, age and party cohesion—characteristics that 
may or may not go together. Furthermore, there are contradictory claims as to whether strong 
partisanship is beneficial to the effectiveness of oversight activity. For instance, Rockman (1984) 
and Beetham (2006) suggest that a high level of partisanship is beneficial to oversight because 
when the opposition parties are mobilized against the ruling party, both they and parliament are 
more likely to effectively perform their watchdog and oversight functions. This line of thinking 
holds the view that government members will not take their oversight tasks seriously because their 
primary interest is to protect their government. But this view neglects the fact that across the 
                                                
3 Although they argue that larger numbers of political parties hamper effective accountability and give greater scope 
for corruption. 
4 A proposal to amend the Constitution to ensure that there will always be a Leader of the Opposition in the House 
of Representatives was defeated in a referendum in November 2015. 
5 The People's Partnership in Trinidad is a political coalition comprising four political parties: the United National 
Congress, the Congress of the People, the Tobago Organization of the People, the National Joint Action Committee.  
Commonwealth, parliamentarians have an institutional, as well as a partisan affiliation; in addition 
to having loyalty to their party they also have loyalty to the institution of parliament.6 
 
It is difficult to say whether – and to what extent - political parties affect the parliaments of 
Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada in oversight. Our field research shows an interesting 
phenomenon: while the current governing party in Grenada is stronger than its Trinidadian 
counterparts (Table 1), the responses from our survey respondents revealed that party cohesion is 
stronger in Trinidad, with a mean score of 4.4 (i.e., ‘fairly strong’) than in Grenada, where party 
cohesion has a mean score of 3.4 (i.e., ‘neither weak nor strong’)!  However, one Grenadian 
Parliamentarian explained to us “political parties portray themselves as strong, even if in practice 
there are problems and tensions internally”. There was greater agreement among Trinidadian 
respondents regarding the degree of partisanship, but less so among Grenadians, with 
parliamentary staff suggesting that the degree of partisanship is ‘strong’ to ‘very strong’ and civil 
society and media respondents suggesting it is ‘neither weak nor strong’. Nonetheless, given the 
lack of consensus noted above, these results cannot provide a clear indication of which legislature 
should be a more effective overseer and thus be better equipped to curb corruption. 
 
One explanation for the results from Grenada is the experience of the 2008-13 Government which  
had a large parliamentary majority (11 out of 15 seats) but which was not united and had five 
cabinet resignations. The first resignation was demanded by the Prime Minister and involved the 
Attorney General who used his office to plead on behalf of a family member facing criminal 
charges in the United States. On the one hand, the resignation sent a positive anti-corruption signal. 
However, the episode sparked unrest within the governing party and four subsequent Cabinet 
Ministers resigned in protest at the Prime Minister’s leadership, and the fallout was a factor in the 
eventual defeat of the government and in the loss of all their seats in the House of Representatives. 
This episode demonstrates how the resignation or sacking of a Cabinet Minister in a very small 
country can disproportionately impact the government, which may act as a disincentive for a Prime 
Minister to take a strong stand against corruption. In such instances, the importance of effective 
parliamentary oversight is heightened if malfeasance is to be thwarted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 The loyalty that legislators have for the institution is quite clear in the case of PACs, whose success have been 
credited, above all, to parliamentarians’ ability to work in a non-partisan fashion (McGee, 2002; Stapenhurst et al, 
2005; Stapenhurst, Pelizzo and Jacobs, 2014). 
Table 1: Political Party Dynamics  
(Scale of 1-5, where for Q 9, 1 = very weak, and 5 = very strong) 
 
Survey 
Question 
Number 
Survey Question Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Mean        Std. 
Score        Dev. 
Grenada 
 
Mean         Std.  
Score         Dev. 
9  How Strong is Political Party Cohesion 4.4  0.6 3.4  1.2 
 How Strong is Political Party Cohesion 
– MPs & Senators 4.3 0.5 
  
4.0 
 
0.0 
 How Strong is Political Party Cohesion 
– Parliamentary Staff 4.4 0.5 
 
4.7 
 
1.2 
 How Strong is Political Party Cohesion 
– Civil Society 4.0 0.6 
 
3.5 
 
1.3 
 How Strong is Political Party Cohesion 
– Journalists 4.5 0.0 
 
3.0 
 
0.0 
 
  
 
A further factor linked to corrupt activity in both jurisdictions is the absence of any regulations or 
restrictions on the amount parties can raise or spend for elections. In Trinidad & Tobago, political 
parties are not formally recognized by statute and they are not legally required to adhere to any 
regulations regarding campaign finance. A similar situation exists in Grenada where spending 
limits for individual candidates are based on the number of registered voters in a constituency. A 
proposed bill to establish an independent Elections and Boundaries Commission, which could have 
at least partially addressed this issue, was rejected in a referendum in Grenada in November 2015 
(Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago, 2015).  
 
Trust in Parliament 
Wang (2005) noted the importance of public trust in parliament if oversight is to be effective. Data 
is not available for Grenada, but data from the World Value Survey indicates that public trust in 
the Parliament of Trinidad & Tobago is low – in 2010-14, only 25.9 percent of respondents 
reported having ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ trust in parliament, a lower percentage than that reported in the 
armed forces, the government, the civil service, the courts, the press or the police. However, this 
trust (in parliament) is significantly higher than in 2001-06, when only 15.7% of respondents 
reported having ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ trust in parliament. This suggests that the emphasis placed on 
public outreach and communications by the Parliament of Trinidad & Tobago is at least helping 
restore what has been called ‘the democratc deficit’ (Stapenhurst, 2011, Smith, 2004). 
 
Given the lack of data for Grenada, this factor cannot be used to explain the differences in 
corruption between the two countries, but remains a relevant factor for other countries where such 
data is available. 
 
Conclusion 
Clearly, the evidence for Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada suggests that contextual factors alone 
cannot, as previously suggested (Wang, 2005; Stapenhurst, 2011), explain differences in 
parliamentary oversight (and hence corruption) – in Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada. The data is 
indeterminate: on the basis of country size, population and economy, Grenada might be expected 
to have lower corruption, while on the basis of government and opposition parties, Trinidad & 
Tobago should have lower corruption; the other factors are indeterminate. As a result, we turn to 
oversight tools and supporting factors. 
 
 
Oversight Tools 
 
A decade ago, Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2006) argued that in order to understand why democracy 
works better in some countries than others, a focus shift from general, macro-level characteristics 
to meso-level characteristics was needed. In other words, in order to understand the functioning of 
a political system or institution, one needed to examine the institution’s powers and not just its 
general characteristics. In the case of parliaments and parliamentary oversight, they suggested that 
our understanding of whether and to what extent parliaments can effectively perform their 
oversight tasks would increase if more attention is paid to the number and the type of oversight 
tools available to parliaments. 
 
There is considerable similarity between the legislature in Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada: both 
have Public Accounts Committees (PAC), Question times, motions of censure, and established 
procedures for votes of no confidence. They also both have a Supreme Audit Institution, Ombuds 
offices and anti-corruption agencies, but only Trinidad & Tobago has a significant library, ‘good’ 
research facilities and strong staff support. The committee system is also more developed in 
Trinidad and Tobago. The evidence (Table 2), therefore, supports the claim that Trinidad & 
Tobago has greater oversight capacity than Grenada.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Oversight Capacity – Oversight Tools and Facilitating Conditions (Summary) 
 Trinidad & Tobago Grenada 
Oversight Tools– Internal   
Audit Committees Public Accounts Committee Public Accounts Committee 
Other Committees Relatively strong; well 
resourced 
Tend to be weak; poorly 
resourced  
Question Period Yes Yes 
Cabinet 
Formation/Dismissal 
No No 
Vote of No Confidence Yes Yes 
Oversight Tools–External   
Supreme Audit Institution Auditor General Audit Department 
Ombuds Office Yes Yes 
Anti-Corruption Agencies Integrity Commission 
Anti-Corruption 
Investigation Bureau 
Integrity Commission 
Financial Intelligence Unit 
Facilitating Conditions   
Staff + Research Facilities Good Poor 
Access To Information Law Yes Pending 
 
 
 
It is not just the existence of oversight tools that is important but also their effectiveness (Pelizzo 
and Stapenhurst, 2014). We consider the perceived effectiveness of the oversight tools in the 
following sections, but we conflate internal and external tools, since the operations of PACs (an 
internal tool) and Auditors General (an external tool) are symbiotic:  the work (and effectiveness) 
of the PAC depends on the work and effectiveness of the Auditor General, and vice versa. 
 
Parliamentary oversight is perhaps especially important with regard to public spending, in what is 
often called Parliamentary ‘Power of the Purse’, Parliamentary oversight of public spending is 
commonly divided into ex-ante (legislative involvement in budget formulation (i.e., the drafting 
and legislative stages) oversight and ex-post oversight (the implementation and audit phases). As 
Diagram 1 shows, parliaments play important roles in the legislative and audit stages of the budget 
process; both Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada follow this process.  
Diagram 1 
Source: Wehner (2004) 
 
 
Wehner (2010) notes that parliaments in the Westminster tradition7 tend to have weak ex-ante 
oversight powers, while Stapenhurst, Eboutou and Jacobs (unpublished) argue that such 
parliaments have strong ex-post oversight. While the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago has taken 
recent steps to strengthen its ex-ante oversight powers —principally through changes to the 
operation of the Standing Finance Committee, the creation of a new Committee on Public 
Administration and Appropriations— the current lack of an Opposition in Grenada’s House of 
Representatives reinforces the fundamental weakness of ex-ante oversight in countries with a 
Westminster-style parliament.  
 
In Westminster parliamentary systems —the most common in the Caribbean— the legislative 
auditor is the Auditor General and a core element of parliamentary oversight. He/she reports 
directly to parliament and the PAC and is sometimes even an officer of parliament, guaranteeing 
independence from the executive (Stapenhurst, Pelizzo and Jacobs, 2014). The relationship 
between the Auditor General and the PAC in this model is crucial: the effectiveness of the PAC 
depends on timely audit reports while an effective PAC ensures the impact of legislative audit.  
 
In short, parliament confers responsibilities to the executive arm of government, which is 
accountable to parliament. The auditor’s mandate, to examine the accounts and, increasingly, 
performance of government, is determined by parliament; the Auditor reports his/her findings to 
parliament, in order to take action. 
 
 
                                                
7 Most Commonwealth countries, with the notable exceptions of Nigeria and Guyana 
Public Accounts Committees 
Both Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada have PACs, but with significant differences in operations 
and effectiveness. As Table 3 indicates, the PAC in Trinidad & Tobago meets more frequently 
(7 or 8 times a year) than the PAC in Grenada (3 times a year). The Trinidadian PAC was judged 
to be slightly better than half-way between very ineffective and very effective’ (with a mean of 
3.1 out of 5) in uncovering fraud and corruption, with MPs, Senators and civil society 
representatives rating the committee as somewhat more effective, with mean scores of 3.3 each, 
and journalists rating it somewhat less effective, with a mean score of 2.8. By contrast, the 
Grenadian PAC was judged to be ‘ineffective’, (mean score of 1.9 out of 5), with parliamentary 
staff rating it somewhat higher (mean of 2.8: about half way between very ineffective and very 
effective) and civil society as lower (1.0: ‘very ineffective’). What causes these differences? In 
both countries, the PAC is chaired by a member of the Opposition8, but the degree of partisanship 
in the committee is considered to be higher in Grenada (mean of 3.8:‘somewhat strong’) 
compared with Trinidad & Tobago (mean of 3.6 out of 5: half-way between ‘neither weak nor 
strong’ and ‘somewhat strong’). There was general consensus on the scoring among respondents 
in Trinidad & Tobago, although civil society representatives thought the degree of partisanship 
to be somewhat higher (mean: 4.2, signifying somewhat higher than ‘strong’ compared with an 
overall average of 3.6, midway between ‘neither weak nor strong’ and ‘strong’) but in Grenada 
journalists thought the committees to be much more partisan (4.3: midway between ‘strong’ and 
‘very strong’). Overall, these results – that the PAC in Trinidad & Tobago is more effective than 
the PAC in Grenada, are consistent with McGee (2002), who pointed out that effective PACs 
were those that acted in a non-partisan manner. 
 
The most recent Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment (PEFA) written by 
Wiggins and Shepherd (2010) gave Grenada the lowest possible score (‘D’) for the legislative 
scrutiny of audit reports, noting that only one PAC report had been presented to the House during 
the 2006-08 period, and no public hearings or recommendations issued by the House in response 
to reports by the Auditors. Survey respondents suggest that little has changed over the past decade; 
indeed things are less transparent as the PAC has met in camera since 2003. 
 
While Trinidad & Tobago only scored somewhat better (‘D+’) in overall legislative scrutiny of 
audit reports, it scored a little better (‘C’) regarding public hearings and recommendations made 
by the House to the government as a result of the audit report (Quist, 2008). Moreover, the recent 
strengthening of the parliamentary committee system in Trinidad & Tobago, and the establishment 
of a PAC-like Committee on Public Enterprises, suggests the potential for improvement in 
oversight of public finance (Stapenhurst, 2016), although no recent assessment has been 
undertaken.  
 
 
                                                
8 In Grenada, by the leader of the Opposition in the Senate 
Table 3: Committees and Commissions  
 
(Scale of 1-5, where 1 = very weak and 5 = very effective) 
Survey 
Question 
Number 
Survey Question Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Grenada 
Mean 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
20 Effectiveness of the PAC* in Uncovering Incidents of 
Fraud and Corruption 
3.1  1.1 1.9  1.1 
 Effectiveness of the PAC* in Uncovering Incidents of 
Fraud and Corruption – MPs & Senators 3.3 1.0 2.0 1.2 
 Effectiveness of the PAC* in Uncovering Incidents of 
Fraud and Corruption-Staff 3.0 0.8 2.8 1.3 
 Effectiveness of the PAC* in Uncovering Incidents of 
Fraud and Corruption-Civil Society 3.3 1.4 1.0  
 Effectiveness of the PAC* in Uncovering Incidents of 
Fraud and Corruption – Journalists 2.8 1.7 1.3 0.5 
 Effectiveness of Special Commissions in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption 
2.9  1.6 2.6  1.0 
 Effectiveness of Special Commissions in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption- MPs & Senators 
3.0 1.4 3.0 1.4 
 Effectiveness of Special Commissions in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption-Staff 
2.4 1.5 4.0  
 Effectiveness of Special Commissions in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption-Civil Society 
3.0 1.8 2.0  
 Effectiveness of Special Commissions in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption – Journalists 
3.3 2.1 2.0 0.0 
16 Degree of Partisanship Within Legislative Oversight 
Committees  
3.6 1.0 3.8 1.0 
 Degree of Partisanship Within Legislative Oversight 
Committees – MPs & Senators 3.3 1.5 3.8 1.3 
 Degree of Partisanship Within Legislative Oversight 
Committees -  Staff 3.3 0.8 3.7 0.6 
 Degree of Partisanship Within Legislative Oversight 
Committees – Civil Society 4.2 1.0 2.0  
 Degree of Partisanship Within Legislative Oversight 
Committees – Journalists 3.3 0.6 4.3 0.5 
 How often do oversight committees meet 7-8 
times 
- 3 
times 
- 
 
* in Trinidad & Tobago, respondents were asked ‘How effective is the PAC and other oversight committees [such as 
the Committee on Public Enterprises and the Joint Select Committees]… 
 
 
 
The Joint Select Committees (JSCs) in Trinidad and Tobago are empowered to inquire and report 
to both Houses of Parliament regarding government ministries, Municipal Corporations, Statutory 
Authorities, State Enterprises and Service Commissions. The Parliament has taken steps to remove 
discrepancies between Senate and House Standing Orders and the JSCs. It has also established 
new JSCs: Government Assurances, Public Appropriation and Administration, National Security, 
Energy Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Human Rights, Diversity and Environment and Sustainable 
Development.  
 
While the JSCs are only able to scrutinize some of the policies and actions of government 
departments and agencies with limited outputs and outcomes from their work (Staddon, 2013), 
some survey respondents suggested that they are becoming more effective in bringing corruption 
issues to the agenda. Significantly, the JSCs are chaired by independent Senators which has 
undoubtedly helped the committees and reduced partisanship. There has also been an increase in 
inquiries and JSC-reports laid by the three established JSCs in the last Parliament (Office of the 
Parliament, 2015). 
 
Other Committees of Inquiry 
Both countries have established special committees or commissions of inquiry. Again, the 
Trinidadian committees were judged as more effective than the Grenadian ones in uncovering 
incidents of fraud and corruption (the former, essentially mid-way between very ineffective and 
very effective (2.9/5) and the latter somewhat less effective (2.6/5)). Only one such Commission 
has been set up in Grenada, in 2008 to investigate the Prime Minister who was alleged to have 
received money in response to an appointment (he was cleared). 
 
 
 
Auditor General 
A major difference between the two countries is the organization and mandate of the auditor. In 
Trinidad & Tobago, the Auditor General was created in 1962, and is appointed by the President, 
after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. The Auditor General 
is independent of government and reports directly to Parliament. In Grenada, by contrast, the 
Director of Audit, also enshrined in the Constitution, is appointed by the Governor-General on the 
advice of the Public Service Commission (who is appointed by the Governor-General, on the 
advice of the Prime Minister). 
 
While the perceived effectiveness of the auditor is essentially the same in both countries (“neither 
effective nor ineffective”9), there is more agreement among Trinidadian participants (with MPs 
and Senators rating the effectiveness slightly lower, and journalists somewhat higher) than among 
Grenadians (where MPs and Senators voted the Director’s office as ‘somewhat effective” and 
journalists as “somewhat ineffective’). In both countries, participants noted that the key constraint 
to audit effectiveness was the lack of action for Parliament to make or follow up on government 
recommendations. See Table 4.    
  
These findings, of similar responses in the two countries, are surprising, since the Grenadian Audit 
Office has considerably less autonomy than does the Auditor General in Trinidad & Tobago. In 
Grenada, the constitution requires that the Director of Audit submit reports to the Minister of 
Finance, who forwards to the House of Representatives, while in Trinidad & Tobago, the Auditor 
General reports directly to Parliament. Both audit offices lack independence in hiring staff (they 
rely on the Public Service Commissions in their countries), and as a result are often under-staffed, 
under-funded and lack qualified auditors. In Trinidad and Tobago, survey respondents criticized 
the Auditor General’s reports for not being adequately probing with more serious 
recommendations, rather than just highlighting minor items or small transgressions. 
 
In Grenada, audit reports are often not addressed by Parliament in a timely manner. In both 
countries, Audit Office access is problematic, especially when government departments fail to 
respond to requests for documentation. In Trinidad & Tobago, this is the case for statutory bodies. 
The requirement for public servants to explain themselves is especially ineffective in Grenada, 
where the PAC does not meet frequently.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 Respondents noted that, even where the Auditor may be doing good work in ensuring financial probity and in 
uncovering cases of fraud and corruption, unless the PAC and the Government have the political will to correct the 
problems found, the impact will be limited.  
Table 4: Auditor General  
(Scale of 1-5, where 1 = very weak and 5 = very effective) 
  Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Grenada 
Survey 
Question 
Number 
Survey Question Mean 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
12 Effectiveness of the Auditor General in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption 
3.2 1.1 3.1 1.4 
 Effectiveness of the Auditor General in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption – MPs & 
Senators 
3.0 0.8 4.4 0.5 
 Effectiveness of the Auditor General in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption – Staff 
3.1 0.9 2.8 2.1 
 Effectiveness of the Auditor General in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption – Civil Society 
3.2 1.3 2.5 1.4 
 Effectiveness of the Auditor General in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption - Journalists 
3.5 1.1 2.0 1.1 
 
 
 
In Trinidad & Tobago financial regulations stipulate that financial reports be submitted to the 
Auditor General. A person who contravenes is fined. However, the sum is so small it fails to act 
as a deterrent. It is also unclear whether procedures are in place to enforce this.  
 
These findings run counter to PEFA assessments, which generally are much more positive. In 
Grenada, the overall score regarding scope, nature and follow-up of external audits was B+, with 
a score of A given for the submission of reports to the National Assembly in a timely manner and 
B for most audit recommendations, especially value-for-money, being accepted by the auditees 
(Wiggins and Shepherd, 2010). Trinidad & Tobago scored slightly worse —B for the scope and 
nature of the audit reports, timely submission of reports to Parliament and response by auditees. 
The principal problem was that there was no evidence of follow-up on corrective measures by the 
Executive in response to the Auditor General’s recommendations (Quist, 2008). The reason for the 
discrepancy between the PEFA assessments and our own results may simply be a deterioration 
since the time of the PEFA assessments, nearly a decade ago, and our own research, or it may be 
that the PEFA assessments are based on a small number of indicators while our survey revealed 
broader opinions and perceptions.  
 
The Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago has begun to improve follow-up measures by revising its 
Standing Orders in June 2015. Previously, there was no requirement for a 60-day response from 
the executive for PAC reports if the report were debated/adopted. A Government Assurances 
committee has also been established to scrutinize Ministerial commitments on the floor of the 
House. 
 
Question Time 
So both countries have Question Time. In Trinidad & Tobago, it was judged to be somewhat more 
effective (mean score of 2.9/5: mid-way between very ineffective nor very effective) than in 
Grenada, where it was considered ‘somewhat ineffective’ (mean score of 2.3/5); see Table 5. 
Respondents believed that the opposition had equal time as the government backbenchers to ask 
questions in both parliaments, similar to findings of other Commonwealth countries.  Unanswered 
questions and delays in answering questions was raised as a concern in Grenada.  The higher 
improved rating in Trinidad and Tobago may be caused by the introduction of the Prime Minister’s 
Question Time in the 10th Parliament (2010-2015). Over the entire 10th Parliament, more than 600 
questions were filed in the House of Representatives, and 84% were answered. In the Senate more 
than 400 questions were filed, and 80% were answered (Office of the Parliament, 2015). 
 
 
Table 5: Question Period  
(Scale of 1-5, where 1 = very ineffective and 5 = very effective) 
  Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Grenada 
Survey 
Question 
Number 
Survey Question Mean 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
26a How Effective is Question Period in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption 
2.9 1.1 2.3 1.3 
26c Does the Opposition Have Equal Time to Ask 
Questions  
1.1 0.2 1.0 0.0 
 
 
 
 
Censure and No Confidence 
The Trinidad & Tobago interviewees reported that while the legislature has the power to censure 
Ministers or the Prime Minister, it rarely does. Westminster convention holds that government 
requires the confidence of the lower house, which is the practice in both countries. This no-
confidence motion is symbolic because the government’s majority means that it is unlikely to be 
removed, but it does raise crucial issues regarding governance. There are, however, examples of 
success. In 2010, the threat of a motion of no-confidence against then Trinidad and Tobago Prime 
Minister Patrick Manning, led to him calling a general election, in which the ruling People’s 
National Movement (PNM) was defeated.   
 
In Grenada, the government can use the Constitution to avoid a vote of no-confidence. It states 
that Parliament must sit at least once per year with no more than 6 months passing between sittings. 
This allows any government to sideline Parliament and delay parliamentary business, including 
votes of confidence.  This was the course of action taken by the previous Prime Minister in 2012 
to help him escape a no-confidence vote against his leadership style. 
 
One controversial innovation in Trinidad & Tobago in the last Parliament was a government 
motion of no confidence in the then Leader of the Opposition, Dr. Rowley. Using a motion of no 
confidence against the Leader of the Opposition is a dubious use of parliamentary procedure – 
such a motion is always likely to be approved because of the government’s majority, leading to a 
suspension from Parliament – the highest level of sanction imposable by the House.  Ultimately it 
was a defeat for the government, which lost the subsequent election and Dr Rowley became Prime 
Minister.  
 
 
Ombudsman, Integrity Commissions, & Anti-Corruption Agencies 
 
At least in part to due to encouragement from external organizations such as the Commonwealth 
Secretariat and the Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption, both Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada have established 
Ombudsman offices and other anti-corruption agencies. 
 
Ombudsman 
Both Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada have Ombudsman offices designed to assist individuals who 
believe that they suffered maladministration within the public service.  
In Trinidad & Tobago, the Ombudsman office, established in 1976, has extensive investigatory 
powers. He/she can enter and inspect any jurisdictional premises and can call for, examine and 
retain any document there and pursue investigations under the Ombudsman’s functions. He/she 
has High Court judicial powers to summon witnesses compelled to give evidence under oath. To 
help ensure independence, the Ombudsman is an Officer of Parliament, only accountable to 
Parliament, submitting annual performance and results reports and making special reports to 
Parliament.  
The Ombudsman office in Grenada is much newer, established in 2007. The Ombudsman does not 
report to Parliament, but its investigative reports may be laid in Parliament by the appropriate 
Minister. In 2017 the mandate of the Office is expanded to include human rights, become the 
National Human Rights Office (Straker, 2017).  
Survey respondents in neither country believe the Office of the Ombudsman is especially effective. 
In Trinidad & Tobago, it was considered just above ‘somewhat ineffective’ and in Grenada, 
‘neither effective nor ineffective’ (Table 5). In Trinidad & Tobago there is a lack of awareness of 
the roles, function and existence of the Ombudsman. Indeed, respondents were generally unaware 
of the Ombudsman.   
 
Integrity Commissions 
The Integrity Commission in Grenada established in 2007 upholds public officials to high 
standards of integrity through declarations of assets, liabilities, income and interests and it 
investigates impropriety, corruption and misconduct by public officials, prosecuting guilty people. 
The Integrity Commission in Trinidad & Tobago has a broader mandate. Its roles include 
prevention and investigation of corruption, enforcement and public education. It also receives 
declarations of income, assets and liabilities, and is responsible for examining the practices and 
procedures of public bodies to facilitate discovery of corrupt practices.  
Respondents often confused Integrity Commissions with other anti-corruption agencies, 
considered below. Regardless respondents did not judge the effectiveness of the Integrity 
Commissions or anti-corruption agencies very highly (Table 6): in both, they ranked at the lower 
end of ‘between somewhat ineffective’ and ‘neither effective nor ineffective’.  
 
Table 6: External Oversight Institutions  
(Scale of 1-5, where 1 = very ineffective and 5 = very effective) 
  Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Grenada 
Survey 
Question 
Number 
Survey Question Mean 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Score 
Std. 
Dev. 
16d Effectiveness of the Ombudsman in Uncovering 
Incidents of Fraud and Corruption 
2.2 1.6 2.3 1.1 
17d Effectiveness of the anti-corruption agency in 
Uncovering Incidents of Fraud and Corruption 
2.6 1.6 3.2 1.6 
 
 
In Grenada, there is an overlapping mandate between the Integrity Commission, the Public Service 
Commission and the Police. The Commission has demonstrated good practice in terms of 
intergroup information sharing between high-level government authorities and now needs to build 
an effective public outreach and education program.  
 
Trinidad & Tobago’s Commission has adopted measures to strengthen its work. Nonetheless, 
respondents reported that a large backlog of work remains, which is due to a lack of human and 
financial resources.  
 
Anti-corruption agencies 
The other anti-corruption agencies, the Anti- Corruption Investigation Bureau (AICB) in Trinidad 
& Tobago and the Financial Intelligence Unit in Grenada, were not ranked better: midway between 
‘somewhat ineffective’ in Trinidad & Tobago and slightly above ‘neither effective nor ineffective’ 
in Grenada (Table 6), with some respondents unaware of the AICB’s work. In Grenada the FIU is 
concerned with money laundering and counter terrorist financing, not anti-corruption per se. 
Survey respondents noted that the work of anti-corruption agencies is undermined by the time it 
takes to complete investigations and the time it takes to enforce sanctions through the courts.  
 
 
Facilitating Factors 
 
Stapenhurst (2011) and Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2014) noted the importance of facilitating   
factors, which reinforce parliamentary oversight, notably information and research capacity, 
distinguishing between within-parliament library facilities and more general access to information.  
 
Library and Research Facilities 
The Parliaments of both Trinidad & Tobago has relatively good library and research facilities 
while in Grenada these resources are limited, as the parliamentary library was damaged by 
hurricane. Respondents were united in believing that library facilities were underused: ‘never 
used’ by MPs and Senators in Trinidad & Tobago, they reported, and ‘rarely’ in Grenada. 
However, a Fiscal Scrutiny Unit has recently been established in Trinidad & Tobago, which is 
likely to increase the timeliness of budget and fiscal analyses to MPs and Senators and should 
result in enhanced oversight of public finances. 
   
Access to Information  
Access to information (ATI) laws provide citizens and interested parties with the right to access 
government documents without having to show legal interest. Robinson and Milko (1994) noted 
that the need for information increases as a legislature progresses from rubber-stamping to an 
informed or transformative institution. Mendel (2005) posits that such laws can make it easier for 
legislators and researchers to obtain information otherwise hard to find, thereby assisting them in 
carrying out parliamentary oversight. Islam (2006) shows that countries that have not enacted ATI 
legislation record higher levels of corruption, although Taveres (2007) qualifies this by finding 
that it is not the mere enactment of legislation which matters, but rather its implementation. 
 
As the Global Right to Information Rating project, backed by the Centre for Law & Democracy 
and Access !Nfo, point out, there is substantial variation in the quality of ATI laws across the 
Caribbean: the Cayman Islands, the best in the region, score 112 out of a possible 138, while 
Guyana, the lowest, scores 69th. Trinidad & Tobago score 89 and rank 50th out of 111 countries. 
See Chart 3. It should be noted, however, that most Caribbean countries have not enacted ATI 
laws and that Grenada has a draft law, yet to be passed by Parliament. 
 
Chart 3: Right to Information Scores 
 
 
Source: http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data and http://www.rti-rating.org/significant-differences-in-caribbean-rti-rating-
scores/  Both accessed April 16, 2017. 
 
 
Trinidad & Tobago passed the Freedom of Information Act in 1999 (implemented in 2001); the 
Ombudsman’s office oversees implementation of the Act. According to RTI, Trinidad & Tobago's 
law has several strengths, including a broad scope and somewhat effective promotional 
mechanism. However its biggest weakness is that, rather than a specialist body, appeals against 
refusals are channeled to the Ombudsman office, which lacks the structural framework to 
effectively perform this function. Other problems include vague rules surrounding fees and many 
exceptions provided for in the legislation. The responsiveness of agencies to FOI requests is not 
uniform. Some agencies do not provide information unless a court order is made.  
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An FOI request by the civil group Fixin T+T tied employees in constituency offices with nepotism 
and resulted in a revision in these procedures as well as a dismissal of a minister for breaching the 
Parliament’s guidelines on the matter. This highlights the potential of FOI in exposing corruption 
and how CSO activity can assist in investigating and reporting wrong-doing.  
 
Other Oversight Mechanisms 
The Senate in both countries plays an important oversight role, especially in Grenada without a 
lower chamber opposition Member. As noted above, in Table 3, in Trinidad & Tobago six Senators 
are appointed on advice from the Leader of the Opposition and nine Senators to represent other 
sectors of civil society, while in Grenada three of thirteen Senators are appointed on the advice of 
the Leader of the Opposition and three more to represent other sectors of society. Thus, while 
Government has a majority in the upper chamber, the Opposition party is represented as are cross 
sections of society. 
 
In Grenada, the Government has launched a Committee of Social Partners (CSP) through which 
the Prime Minister can solicit advice and feedback from different elements of society on policies 
and draft laws. The CSP meets monthly and is comprised of representatives of the private sector, 
the trade unions, NGOs, religious organizations and youth. The CSP presents an Annual Report to 
Parliament for debate. While the objective of the CSP is not to oversee government, respondents 
spoke positively of this innovative approach to governance. 
 
Recommendations 
Before making recommendations for enhanced oversight tools, some consideration of trust in 
parliament is warranted. How can trust in parliament be increased? As noted in Table 5, public 
trust in Trinidad & Tobago’s Parliament is low:  according to World Values Survey, only 25.9% 
of respondents reported having ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ trust in parliament, lower than in other public 
institutions, but higher than 2001-06, when only 15.7% of respondents reported having ‘a lot’ or 
‘some’ trust in parliament. 
What are the causes of this improvement? Parliament is now more operationally efficient and more 
effective in citizen communication. There is a code of conduct and public declaration of assets by 
MPs and more transparency in parliamentary deliberations, including committee meetings, and 
improving budget oversight. 
Support from the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate is well entrenched, but maybe 
difficult to officially facilitate when legislatures do not have control over staff recruitment, and 
especially of the senior public servant, the Clerk of Parliament.  High turnover among 
parliamentary service people is common in many countries, but in Trinidad & Tobago the Clerk 
has been in post for over 15 years. Her long experience in office and commitment to Parliament 
has enabled her to argue with the executive and given her the authority to work around public 
service constraints by offering a more favorable package to capable staff on a short-term 
contractual basis. The Clerk is a key factor in parliamentary strengthening over the last 10 years. 
On Grenada, by contrast, the current Clerk is a recent appointee of government, and he has not 
been able to play as proactive a role as has the Clerk in Trinidad & Tobago.  
 
Making Oversight Tools More Effective 
 
Both Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada have a full array of oversight tools; the issue is making these 
tools effective. Again, the recommendations need to be country-specific. 
 
Having an effective committee system is necessary. While committees have been strengthened in 
Trinidad & Tobago (with regular committee meetings and public hearings, and adequate 
administrative and research support), effectiveness is limited by part-time MPs. In Grenada the 
committee system is under-developed. The Finance Committee meets as a Committee of the 
Whole, leaving partisan politics to the Chamber. Since the number of backbench MPs to serve on 
committees is limited, certain facets of ‘the Westminster’ system should be relaxed:  
 
➢ Committee membership should comprise MPs and Senators  
➢ Ministers should be allowed to sit on Committees, and where necessary chair committees 
– but not committees that oversee their departments  
➢ Committee membership should include appointees from the public at large 
➢ Clerks and researchers (the latter perhaps as interns) should be provided to support 
committees. 
 
The CSP in Grenada performs a useful function, although it is not a substitute for parliamentary 
oversight. The Prime Minister chairs the CSP and there is no official opposition representative on 
the body. This forum has not had a focus on oversight or corruption.  Closer links between the 
CSP and Parliament would be useful, particularly with a new parliamentary building expected to 
be open during 2018. 
 
PACs should have the power to subpoena documents and witnesses, should promote ‘government 
accountability’ and should strive to increase public involvement (McGee, 2002). In Grenada, in 
the current absence of any Opposition Members in the lower House, the Chair of the PAC is the 
ranking Opposition Senator, which makes committee operations and achieving a bipartisan 
approach difficult, given his responsibilities as leader of the Opposition. 
 
A workshop held in Port of Spain to consider oversight in the Caribbean concluded that small 
parliaments establish a body of unelected, apolitical officials with a public audit background to 
review audit reports by local governments. Such a body, in effect, ‘ad hoc PAC’, could examine 
Audit reports, call witnesses and make recommendations to the parliamentary PA.C which would 
review the work and issue an endorsement to the advisory committee’s report. The workshop also 
suggested that small countries in the Caribbean, like Grenada, establish a ‘regional PAC’ so that 
potential synergies can be developed and support systems established and rationalized 
(ParlAmericas, 2014).  
 
Having an effective, independent Auditor General is also important. Generally, it is recommended 
that Auditors General have the mandate to report key findings publicly with user-friendly reports, 
and that the PAC know the Auditor’s budget and work plans (ParlAmericas, 2012).     
 
More specifically, the Auditor-General in Trinidad & Tobago should be empowered to impose 
administrative sanctions on government departments, agencies and statutory bodies that do not 
submit their financial reports on time. ‘Naming and shaming’ could also help, with the Auditor 
General publishing a list of non-compliant agencies and statutory bodies. The AG office also needs 
independence in hiring, promoting and firing staff, and not be dependent on the Public Service 
Commission (PSC), which in the past has taken 2-4 years to recruit staff (MESICIC, 2013); this 
could be achieved by the delegation of authority by the PSC.   Parliament should also consider 
legislating the global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which seeks to enhance 
the transparency of payments from extractive companies to governments, into the country’s laws 
to ensure EITI forms part of the legal framework and provides an independent assessment of the 
revenues and payments declared by government and the extractive companies. 
 
In Grenada, the Audit Department should be able to send its reports directly to Parliament, and not 
through the Department of Finance, as at present. Working with the PAC, the Department could 
better inform the public of their work, activities and outcomes, especially relating to corruption. 
And again, the Audit Office should be able to hire staff independently. There could also be a 
vehicle for developing linkages between the Audit Department and the CSP, with the aim of 
establishing channels for social audit.   
 
Perhaps the biggest problem regarding ombudsman offices is that public servants, and the general 
public, are generally unaware of their existence. Outreach activities and public education activities 
should be enhanced and, in Trinidad & Tobago, Parliament itself could assist, given its 
communications expertise.  
 
Adequate budgets and financial autonomy were noted as problems. While ombudsman offices, 
like other public bodies, need to accept and operate within fiscal reality, Parliaments in both 
countries could help ensure that the ombuds offices have some financial independence. This degree 
of autonomy is important, especially if the Ombudsman is investigating complaints about the 
Ministry of Finance. Autonomy in human resource management is also desirable.  
 
It would seem useful, too, if the ombuds offices could establish time frames for public agencies to 
respond to their requests for information, and also have appropriate noncompliance enforcement 
mechanisms. Public outreach and communications strategies are also required, including training 
for public officials on their responsibilities under the Code of Conduct.  
 
In Trinidad & Tobago, the Commission is required to forward any breaches of Codes of Conduct 
to Parliament and to the Director of Public Prosecution to take appropriate disciplinary action – 
but the institutions are not well coordinated. A formal information exchange should be established 
between the Commission and relevant agencies. Similarly, in Grenada collaborative arrangements 
need to be made between the Commission and the Financial Intelligence Unit, the Audit 
Department and the Director of Public Prosecutions (MESICIC, 2014). The Integrity Commissions 
need more access for prompt judgments. Whistleblower legislation may also prove useful in the 
fight against corruption and provide protection for individuals when exposing corruption.  
 
Again, like the ombudsmen offices, the Commissions lack the power to impose administrative 
sanctions and financial and human resource autonomy. Parliaments should review these issues to 
ensure that the Commission is adequately resourced with financial autonomy. Grenada needs 
Parliament to have a stronger role in the appointment of the heads of constitutional watchdogs. 
Especially given the current lack of opposition voice in the House, the focus should be on the 
Senate to review and approve such appointments, as is the case in many countries with presidential 
forms of government. Given concerns about conflict of interest in small institutions, a non-citizen 
could be appointed as head of the Integrity Commission in both jurisdictions. While such a move 
has not, to our knowledge, been taken before, there are precedents of Auditors General who are 
citizens of another Commonwealth country being appointed; e.g. John Doyle, the Auditor General 
of British Columbia from 2007-2013 is an Australian citizen.  
 
There are some further measures that the legislatures in both countries should prioritize, including 
a tougher parliamentary code of conduct, ethics committees, and using CPA benchmarks on Codes 
of Conduct. MPs and integrity commissions should fully and regularly disclose their financial 
assets and business interests. This would help generate and demonstrate a culture of accountability, 
thereby potentially raising public trust in parliaments. In terms of the issue of campaign financing 
and political party registration, the Organization of American States has developed a Model Law 
for Caribbean countries which provides transparency and accountability guidance; again, the 
adoption of such a law could boost public trust. Finally, one area that has caused recent controversy 
in Trinidad & Tobago has been the use of constituency offices which are paid by the parliament, 
but under the control of Members. Members should be required to publish reports on how this 
money is spent, thereby allaying public fears that the funds are used for re-election or personal 
purposes.  
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The research regarding parliamentary oversight in corruption in Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada 
presents some interesting and surprising conclusions. We group these under three main headings: 
parliamentary oversight and corruption; executive dominance of parliament; and the challenges 
and solutions to parliamentary oversight in small states. 
 
Parliamentary Oversight and Corruption 
First, with regard to the causal chain between oversight and corruption, our results cast doubt on 
the results of previous research (e.g., Wang, 2005, Olson and Norton, 1996), which indicated that 
contextual factors were the principal determinant of differences in parliamentary oversight (and 
hence corruption). The results presented here do not support previous findings: in fact, it is rather 
inconclusive: on the basis of country size, population and economy, Grenada might be expected 
to have lower corruption, while on the basis of government and opposition parties, Trinidad & 
Tobago should have lower corruption; the other factors are indeterminate.  
 
Secondly, our results also cast doubt on the earlier results (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004) that the 
establishment or adoption of oversight tools is a determinant of corruption. Both countries have a 
similar range of internal parliamentary oversight tools, namely, Public Accounts and other 
oversight Committees, Question Time, and a Votes of No Confidence (although, as is typical in 
other countries with a Westminster parliamentary tradition, neither the Parliament of Trinidad & 
Tobago nor the Parliament of Grenada play a role in Cabinet formation or dismissal). Similarly, 
both countries have a similar array of extra-parliamentary institutions, namely an Auditor General 
(or Audit Department, in the case of Grenada), a number of anti-corruption agencies and 
Ombudsman.  
 
Thirdly, it has been claimed that it is not the mere existence of these oversight tools that is 
important, but their effectiveness (Stapenhurst, Pelizzo and Jacobs, 2014). The evidence collected 
indicates that the key internal and external oversight tools and institutions are somewhat more 
effective – although still not particularly effective - in Trinidad & Tobago than in Grenada, with 
the exception of the anti-corruption agencies, which are considered to be somewhat more effective 
– but still not particularly effective – in Grenada. The evidence, while limited, also indicates that 
facilitating factors are also stronger in Trinidad & Tobago. This is surprising, because ceteris 
paribus, we would expect, therefore, that corruption would be lower in Trinidad & Tobago than 
in Grenada, but we know that is not the case.  
 
Are these results peculiar to the Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada, or are they generalizable to other 
small states, especially those in the Caribbean? Clearly, further research is needed. 
 
Executive Domination of Parliament 
As in many Commonwealth countries, there is a perception that government dominates the 
institutions. To counter this, the institutions must not only be constitutionally independent, but 
must be perceived independent. Having them report to parliament, as does the Auditor General in 
Trinidad & Tobago, would be a first step. The oversight institutions, and indeed parliaments 
themselves, need financial autonomy and freedom to manage human resources. If oversight 
institutions are dependent on government departments or public agencies controlled by 
government, they are likely under-resourced. The general public and public sector officials are 
mostly unaware of the mandate, work and output of oversight institutions. Again, the Parliament 
of Trinidad & Tobago sets a good example of how public awareness can be raised. 
 
To counteract executive dominance, both countries have established Senates which allow for 
opposition and independent Senators, the latter representing citizen groups and associations. 
Facing the particular program of no opposition party in the lower chamber, the Grenadian 
government has established a consultative citizen group. This is an interesting and novel approach 
for increasing public participation and representation in government, but there is a danger that it 
could undermine parliament. Parliaments could also pro-actively reach out to civil society groups, 
with the aim of giving these organizations ‘voice’ and boosting information from the public that 
could help strengthen oversight.    
 
Challenges and Solutions Regarding Parliamentary Oversight in Small States  
Our research indicates that the issues and weaknesses in parliamentary oversight are fundamentally 
different in small countries than in large, and that one cannot generalize across small countries. 
Most international organizations and donor agencies accept this, but given the lack of evidence 
about how oversight in small countries works, they fall back on archetype institutions. Evidence 
presented here confirms that the lessons learned in the UK and Canada are largely irrelevant to 
small countries, and the lessons in one small country may not easily transfer to other small 
countries. A country-focused approach is necessary. 
 
One problem that affects both Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada, and, we suspect, other small 
Commonwealth states as well, is that the Westminster-form of parliamentary governance is not 
suited to small states. Certain facets of ‘the Westminster’ system need to be relaxed, to reflect the 
contextual differences between the United Kingdom and larger Commonwealth states and smaller 
island economies. For example, given the small number of elected MPs, joint House-Senate 
committees should be established and Ministers membership should be allowed to sit on 
Committees, although not to committees that oversee their departments. Committee membership 
could include appointees from the public at large, as is the case in some Pacific islands. To 
overcome the lack of resources, staff from the Auditor General’s office could routinely support the 
PAC and the limited staff resources in parliament could be supplemented by college or high-school 
interns.  
 
A more common problem, which larger states also face, but which is perhaps more acute in small 
countries is the lack of ‘joined-up’ oversight. There are a plethora of parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary institutions undertaking oversight, including parliamentary committees, auditors 
general, integrity commissions and anti-corruption agencies. Many of these institutions are not 
independent of government. Parliaments could encourage their greater autonomy and financial 
independence from government, by advocating that these institutions report to parliament, rather 
than to the government, and by taking the lead in fostering greater co-ordination and collaboration.   
 
  
In short, both countries have oversight tools and mechanisms to hold governments to account, and 
thereby reduce corruption, but their effectiveness has been limited. The recommendations made in 
this article should enhance their effectiveness. But are they likely to be adopted? Political will to 
adopt reforms is critical but, as in other countries, inertia often dominates the political 
environment.  Until citizens demand that their elected representatives establish various oversight 
and anti-corruption mechanisms and ensure these mechanisms are free of political influence and 
are adequately resourced, the institutions will be ‘window dressing’ and corrupt actions will 
continue undeterred and unpunished. The fact that the recent proposed constitutional changes were 
in Grenada were rejected by the electorate indicates both a the level of popular resistance to 
fundamental reform, on the one hand and – as was alleged by some survey respondents – the 
capture of the reform process by vested political interests. 
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